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This paper's purpose was to examine the impact of geomagnetic activity (GMA) on the timing and valuation of earnings information disclosed by firms every quarter.

The authors start the analyses with a sample of 112,669 client firms from 1989 to 2018. To analyze the impact of GMA on the earnings response coefficient (ERC), the authors use the three-day cumulative abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the extended post-earnings announcement window [2, 75] as the dependent variables. The authors interact unexpected earnings (UE) with the C9 Index, an index commonly used to measure GMA and study how GMA affects the pricing of new public information. To examine the effect of GMA on the timing of disclosure of earnings news, the authors regress a variant of the GMA index on the propensity to disclose bad earnings news.

The authors find significantly lower earnings response coefficients during periods of high GMA. This effect is permanent and stock prices do not correctly incorporate the implications of earnings information over time. The authors also show that managerial behavior is affected by GMA as well and the managers are more (less) likely to release bad (good) news during periods of higher activity. Finally, the authors also find that in situations where stakeholders are likely to rely on modern technology that depends minimally on humans, the adverse impact of GMA on the pricing of earnings information is mitigated.

The literature on the effect of GMA on the capital market is very limited and focuses primarily on stock returns, while the behavioral finance literature focuses on circumstances like weather, temperature and sporting outcome to study how the investors' mood affects their capital market behavior. The authors add to both the literature by investigating how GMA influences investors' and managers' behaviors in the capital market.

This paper posits that the precision of accounting estimates should be an increasing function of experience due to learning effects. Using a sample of 747 observations for 305 firms for the period 1993–96 with complete data available on the COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and COMPACT DISCLOSURE databases, the paper conducts regression analyses to examine the precision of two estimates (discount rates and health care cost inflation rates) required under SFAS 106. Tests show that the estimation errors for the health care cost inflation estimates decrease with experience, but those for discounts rates do not. The results persist after controlling for the profile of participants of the health care plan, predisclosure uncertainty, and propensity to manipulate by managers. The results are consistent with “learning effect” for health care cost inflation rates that were being estimated for the first time, while no such effect is visible for discount rates that had been estimated in the past for pension plans. The paper also hypothesizes that the market rewards perceived precision of accounting estimates attributable to learning effect. Cross‐sectional tests confirm that the valuation coefficient of postretirement benefit obligations increases in absolute value as the estimation errors decline, suggesting that the market relies more on reported accounting estimates as their perceived precision improves. Thus, the extant research findings of weak or non‐existent value relevance of SEAS 106 liabilities may have been confined to the initial period after the adoption of SEAS 106 when the measurement errors were high. The documented evidence of improvement in precision provides support for FASB's claim that the reliability of accounting estimates, especially those required by complex standards such as SEAS 106, should improve with experience. The evidence of improvement in value‐relevance should also be reassuring for FASB, since one of the intended benefits of SEAS 106 was to provide value relevant information to the investors.

This paper aims to address three questions: Does the abnormal delay in the audit process signal poor earnings quality? Is this information about earnings quality incremental to that contained in earnings report delay? Does the market use this information about earnings quality in valuing the firm?

Data are obtained from four databases: Compustat, Audit Analytics, Compact-Disclosure and I/B/E/S. Complete data are available for 5,298 firms for 22,492 firm-years. The paper uses a two-stage model. In the first stage, a detailed model using determinants from extant research tries to explain the audit delay. In the second stage, the unexplained delay from the first stage is used in the association tests with earnings quality.

The paper presents evidence that abnormal delays in the audit process are inversely associated with earnings quality. When the market values a dollar of reported earnings, it appears to discount the valuation by the extent of abnormal audit delay.

The current paper contributes to existing research in several ways. First, it establishes a comprehensive model to explain audit delays and provides a tool to measure abnormal audit delays. Second, it provides evidence of inverse association between abnormal audit delay and seven proxies of earnings quality. Finally, the paper shows that abnormal audit delay creates skepticism among investors about earnings quality and they value the disclosed earnings after discounting for such delay.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the Enron scandal, Arthur Andersen's demise and the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act on audit fees.

The paper uses empirical methodology (univariate and multivariate).

Audit fees and the Big‐4 premium increased in 2002. Increase was larger for bigger and riskier clients. Evidence is also consistent with a competitive market for former Andersen clients.

Data requirements might bias the sample towards larger sized firms. Data availability limits the number of observations.

The research findings on audit fees in post‐Enron and Arthur Andersen period reported in this paper are important for policy makers.

It is found that the premium charged by Big 4 over non‐Big 4 has increased in 2002, and that the ability of an auditor to charge a premium is adversely affected when its reputation is tarnished. It is also reported that the frequency of voluntary switches within the Big 4 is lowest in 19 years. The audit fee model was also refined by adding two ownership variables to control for agency aspect of client firms; inside and institutional ownership.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of US firms' postretirement benefits choices.

The paper uses empirical methodology (univariate and multivariate) to test the research hypotheses.

Industry norm, average employee age, financial structure, and firm size are significant factors in the determination of the proportion of compensation that is deferred. Industry norm, financial structure, and firm size are significant factors that determine the percentage of deferred compensation that is negotiated as defined benefits. Finally, industry norm, corporate tax rates, and cash flow help explain the percentage of defined benefits that are paid in the form of retiree health benefit plans.

Data requirements might bias the sample towards larger sized firms. Data availability limits the number of observations in 2000 and 2001.

The trends in post‐retirement benefits reported in this paper are important for policy makers.

These findings have implications for the baby boomers. The trend to offer smaller proportion of compensation as deferred benefits reflects the increasing costs of deferral to the employers. This increases the employees' responsibilities to save on their own. This also would shift the retirees' dependence on the public pension system for their retirement income. The trend to favor defined‐contribution plans instead of defined‐benefit plans reflects the employers' attempts to diversify their risks of paying promised post‐retirement benefits by transferring the risk to the employee. On the other hand, the popularity of defined‐contribution pension plans also reflects the increased Government's incentives to encourage savings via 401‐k plans and employee's willingness to manage their own pension portfolios.

This research provides accounting-ethics authors and administrators with a benchmark for accounting-ethics research. While Bernardi and Bean (2010) considered publications in business-ethics and accounting’s top-40 journals this study considers research in eight accounting-ethics and public-interest journals, as well as, 34 business-ethics journals. We analyzed the contents of our 42 journals for the 25-year period between 1991 through 2015. This research documents the continued growth (Bernardi & Bean, 2007) of accounting-ethics research in both accounting-ethics and business-ethics journals. We provide data on the top-10 ethics authors in each doctoral year group, the top-50 ethics authors over the most recent 10, 20, and 25 years, and a distribution among ethics scholars for these periods. For the 25-year timeframe, our data indicate that only 665 (274) of the 5,125 accounting PhDs/DBAs (13.0% and 5.4% respectively) in Canada and the United States had authored or co-authored one (more than one) ethics article.

This study investigates the incremental value‐relevance of non‐pension postretirement benefit obligations and expenses (disclosed by firms pursuant to SFAS 106). Our study is motivated by previously published evidences that investors value the SFAS 106 measure of postretirement benefit obligations. However, prior research does not address incremental value‐relevance of the SFAS 106. We address two related questions. First, “do the SFAS 106 measures of non‐pension postretirement benefit obligations and expenses provide incremental value relevance (after controlling for information available from non‐SFAS 106 sources).” Second, “under what circumstances are the SFAS‐106 measures more likely to provide incremental value relevance.” The key findings of this paper are: (i) on average, SFAS 106 measures of postretirement benefit obligations and expenses have no significant incremental value‐relevance after controlling for non‐SFAS 106 information; and (ii) labor intensity and the magnitude of postretirement benefit obligation increases the incremental value‐relevance of SFAS 106 measures.

The purpose of this paper is to show that director turnover varies in predictable and intuitive ways with director incentives.

The paper uses a sample of 51,388 observations pertaining to 13,084 directors who served 1,065 firms during the period 1997‐2004. The data are obtained from RiskMetrics, Compustat, Execu‐Comp, CRSP, IBES, and the Corporate Library databases. Portfolio analysis, logit, and GLIMMIX regression analysis are used for the tests.

The paper provides evidence that directors are more likely to leave when firm performance deteriorates and the firm becomes riskier. While turnover increasing as firm performance deteriorates is consistent with involuntary turnover, directors are also more likely to leave in advance of deteriorating performance. The latter is consistent with directors having inside information and acting on that information to protect their wealth and reputation. When inside and outside director turnover is contrasted, the association between turnover and performance is stronger for inside directors.

Since data are obtained from multiple databases, the sample may be biased in favor of larger firms. The results may, therefore, not be applicable to smaller firms. To the extent that the story is unable to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary director turnover, the results should be interpreted with caution.

Even though extant research has looked extensively at the determinants of CEO turnover, little has been written on director turnover. Director turnover is an important topic to study, since directors, especially outside directors, possess a significant oversight role in the corporation.

This paper sets out to test the effects of firms’ and industry's R&D intensity on persistence of abnormal earnings.

Ohlson's valuation model is used with pooled regressions along with Fama–Macbeth methodology on yearly regressions and partitioning on Herfindahl index to conduct the tests.

It was found that firms’ and industries’ R&D intensities are both positively correlated with persistence of abnormal earnings. The evidence suggests that the positive effect on earnings persistence caused by R&D's effectiveness in mitigating competition dominates the negative effect brought by more risk from R&D projects

The fact that the firm's own R&D investment leads to incremental earnings persistence beyond that of the industry suggests the importance of incorporating both industry and firm's R&D intensity in earnings persistence. While industry R&D investment leads to competition mitigation via creation of entry barriers, a firm's own investment in R&D differentiates its products from those of its competitors, and thereby results in further competition mitigation by creating replacement barriers.

Finally, since R&D intensity is correlated with earnings persistence, inclusion of R&D intensity in future earnings persistence studies may lead to better model specification by reducing the problem of correlated omitted variables.

This paper aims to apply the Capital Market Liability of Foreignness (CMLOF) framework to the audit fees of a sample of foreign firms listed on US exchanges to examine whether American auditors price foreignness.

The four components of the CMLOF are institutional distance (civil versus common law system and enforcement), information asymmetry (disclosures and mandatory IFRS adoption), unfamiliarity (exports, English language and geographical distance) and cultural difference [Hofstede (1980) dimensions of culture]. These variables are examined in a regression model that explains audit fees to determine the auditor perception of risk associated with the CMLOF.

Examining the factors that mitigate perceived agency costs, this investigation determines that auditors price risk according to each component of the liability of foreignness. Audit fees are higher for shareholders of firms headquartered in countries exhibiting greater institutional distance, unfamiliarity and cultural distance. Audit fees are higher for firms when their home country requires additional disclosures or the adoption of IFRS to reduce information asymmetry.

CMLOF is costly for capital market participants and has implications for auditors, shareholders of foreign firms and managers considering listing in the US Auditors, and investors should carefully assess this risk for pricing and valuation, and managers should take action, to the extent possible, to reduce the firm-specific level of unfamiliarity and increase transparency.

This paper is the first to apply the CMLOF to examine whether auditors price aspects of foreignness of their non-US-headquartered clients.